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ABSTRACT 
This chapter discusses the concept of class in an important subfield, the sociology 
of law. Class, a pivotal institution of society, was central to the earliest studies of 
legal institutions and of law and inequality in particular. More recently, class has 
played a less important role. This chapter argues for the continuing importance 
of class and provides examples of its potential use in contemporary sociolegal 
research. The first part reviews early work that employed class and instrumental 
models of the state. Grounded, anti-formal models of law provided a contrast-
ing view. Following wider trends in the discipline, sociology of law turned from 
structural models to theories oflaw as an ideology, and most recently, as reviewed 
in the second part, to law as an element of consciousness and experience. While 
acknowledging the value of contemporary research that documents a deeply tex-
tured, paradoxical, and nuanced analysis of the role oflaw in society, the third part 
argues for theorizing the link between experience and context, including the role 
of social class, and presents a research agenda for a sociology oflaw, where there-
lationship between law and class is considered both as institution and experience. 
"The plain fact is that in a new stage of capitalism, class divides as 
ruthlessly as it did in the age of the Robber Barons." 
Richard Sennett, 1 1942 
1 As quoted in "Back to Class Warfare:• The New York Times, December 27, 1994. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this essay we review the ways in which class has been conceptualized and used 
to explain the role of legal institutions in society. Though always controversial 
in American social science, class is nonetheless central in thought and theorizing 
about society, including its legal institutions. In the past two decades, theories 
of class and social structure have been endlessly critiqued, and the importance of 
class as a research concept reduced to the point of near extinction. Class is only 
now beginning to be reconsidered-as one more anchor of personal identity 
like gender, race, and ethnicity. The contemporary tum from structural theory 
toward interpretive studies of experience emphasizes nuanced descriptions of 
actors' orientations to law in a particular context, but it has offered little to 
explain the interaction between individual agency and continuing patterns of 
political or economic hierarchy. 
Understanding the structural foundations of class continues to be important 
in the postmodern world. Class describes an individual's position with respect 
to the central economic and cultural institutions of society and, in turn, relates 
that position to the social resources available to the individual. Just as new ways 
have been found to bring the state back in or to create a new institutionalism 
that acknowledges the importance of complex continuing patterns in social 
life-but purged of deterministic claims-so class must be reconceptualized. 
Indeed, our review of sociolegal research shows that class has continued to be 
an important, if largely implicit, concept not only making possible a clearer 
understanding of the distributive effects of economies but also providing a key 
to understanding power in contemporary society. 
We show here that class, as a marker for the distributive effects of law, has 
been of great importance in sociolegal studies. In the 1970s, structural theories 
began to decline in importance. In the sociology of law, the importance of 
class was diminished still further by the weight of arguments of neo-Marxists 
and others that law is an ideological force, not a straightforward reflection of 
resource inequality or a simple instrument of domination. 
The interpretive and postmodern turn in sociology is reflected in contem-
porary sociolegal research on legal culture and legal consciousness, and on 
narrative and discourse about law. The critique and decline of grand theory did 
not undercut interest in the concrete distributive consequences of law, the bread 
and butter of the field, but the shift did sever these studies conceptually from 
their roots in general theories of society. The second part of this chapter de-
scribes the shift as well as the conceptual limits of this paradigm: Agency alone 
will not provide an understanding of the group-life of a society or its institutions 
or the ways in which class continues to form an important bridge between those 
contingencies that comprise elements of an actor's own understanding of action 
and those of which the actor is unaware. 
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Finally, the third part of the chapter presents a research agenda for a sociology 
oflaw where the tension between structure and agency, class and law, frames the 
undertaking. Using recent studies as examples, we show why the institutions 
of class continue to explain dimensions of inequality and hierarchy and how 
incorporating a nuanced, agency-sensitive concept of class will contribute to 
the development of sociology of law and to class theory. 
THEORY AND THE PROBLEM OF LAW AND INEQUALITY 
The sociology of law has always drawn on theories prevailing in the discipline. 
Early sociology of law was shaped by mainstream theories, including con-
flict, structural-functional, and grounded theories of society (Dahrendrof 1959, 
Parsons 1964, Glaser & Strauss 1967). Conflict and structural-functional the-
ories have been particularly influential in the sociology of law. Both were 
derived from nineteenth century social theory of industrial society in which 
class structure was understood as fundamental, as a source of both order and 
conflict. The purpose of the state was to make the differentiation of social roles 
at the heart of class structure work smoothly (structural-functional theory) or 
to contain the inevitable conflict that resulted from inequality created by class 
structure (conflict theory). Marxist conflict theory also viewed the state as an 
instrument of the ruling class or some combination of dominant classes (Marx 
& Engels 1950). In all of these theories of the class-state, the law legitimates 
state authority, enabling the state to carry out its purposes (see Evans 1963). 
Almost all early sociology of law accepted this fundamental ordering of class, 
law, and the state. Weber's theory of legal formalism and the role of the legal 
profession in maintaining the authority of law has also been influential. It is 
not surprising, therefore, given the lineage of the theories dominating the early 
sociology of law, that economic class was universally and uncontroversially the 
measure employed in research on law and inequality. 
A second perspective in the sociology of law was employed in studying 
inequality, but without connection to grand theory. Sociology oflaw shares with 
the discipline at large a body of research that begins with an anti-instrumental 
and anti-formal model of the relationship between law and inequality. Growing 
out of symbolic interactionism and inductive, grounded theory of society, law 
and inequality are explained as social processes marked by situation and context 
(Goffman 1956, 1961, Berger & Luckmann 1966). 
Research within the sociology of law thus grew from widely shared theoret-
ical perspectives within the discipline, and the contradictory premises of these 
perspectives, structural on one hand and antistructural on the other, contained 
the seeds of tensions that have driven debates within the field about the role of 
structure and class. Sociology of law has also been deeply influenced by intel-
lectual traditions specific to legal scholarship, particularly liberal legalism. In 
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contrast to conflict, structural-functional, and grounded theories, liberal legal-
ism is not a theory, but rather a "description of ideal practices on which law as 
we know it is said to depend" (Munger 1993:99). In this model of a sociology 
of law, social science helps policymakers achieve the law's ideals of fairness 
and equality. The influence of liberal legalism explains, in part, the tendency 
of American sociology of law to focus on description of legal problems rather 
than on theory development. 2 
Law and Inequality From the Top Down 
Law and society scholars, finding the egalitarian pretensions of both liberal 
legalism and state theories of law an easy target, produced a vast literature 
exploring the inevitable gap between an ideal of equal justice on the books and 
the biases introduced by social organization into the law in action (Abel1980). 
Class was often an important element of the explanation of the "gap," but it was 
rarely developed theoretically. 
Numerous studies examined access to justice for persons of limited means. 
Research projects at the American Bar Foundation and elsewhere documented 
the legal problems of the poor. The poor, it was shown, made only limited 
use of lawyers and law, and a resources theory (Mayhew & Reiss 1969) was 
developed to explain the failure to act in terms of lack of knowledge, lack of 
material resources, or passivity in the face of oppression (Levine & Preston 
1970, Curran 1977, Carlin, Howard & Messinger 1966, Mayhew 1968). 
Abel (1973) reviewed this literature and reframed its agenda in more general 
terms as a theory of the structure of dispute processing. While dispute process-
ing theory and research has been criticized for failing to examine underlying 
social conflict (including class conflict) as well as the interplay and contesta-
tion that "socially constructs" all of social life (Kidder 1980--1981, Berger & 
Luckmann 1966), Abel's model provided a more precise conceptualization of 
the effects of structural inequalities on legal and prelegal conflict resolution 
than did any prior work (see also Felstiner, Abel & Sarat 1980--1981, Miller & 
Sarat 1980--1981). 
Studies examined the stratification of the legal profession, especially in large 
cities (Smigel1964, Carlin 1962, Handler 1967). Smigel's seminal study of the 
Wall Street lawyer, for example, documented the ways in which class and status 
intersected to create a closed world of elite, WASP law practice dominated and 
controlled by men. Class background and the privileges of status, as measured 
by such indices as membership in the Social Register, were of no significance 
for women, as Epstein's (1983) work made abundantly clear: Daughters of 
2 As a number ofscholars have reported, in projects growing out of this model sociologists often 
played a second-class role to legal academics (see Simon and Lynch 1989, Skolnick 1965). 
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the elite were systematically denied entry to the Wall Street firms of their 
brothers. Epstein's work demonstrates how gender alters the effects of class on 
the stratification of legal practice. If gender was one key to exclusion from the 
professional elite, so was service to clients at the lowest extreme of the class 
structure, and several studies examined the careers and commitment oflawyers 
for the poor (Handler et al1978, Katz 1982). 
Research showed the dependence of lawyers on the class structure of soci-
ety. A market-dependence theory of the legal profession, linking professional 
organization and individual lawyer behavior to economic dependence on a cap-
italist market, profoundly influenced empirical research on both stratification 
and the role of the profession in society (Abel 1989). A more sophisticated 
theory of market dependence, combining literatures on the lawyer-client re-
lationship, network analysis, and theories of mobility showed that lawyers in 
Chicago were stratified into two hemispheres of law practice defined by net-
works of professionals embodying distinct differences in clients, organization 
of practice, career lines, and values (Heinz & Laumann 1982). 
A large body of research on the role of courts and adjudication (see Galanter 
1986 for an extensive review), documented the gap between the promises of 
fairness and equality and the practices of the legal process. Research examined 
the stratified functions and effects of courts (Wanner 1974, 1975), their rela-
tionship to external social organization, and the construction of roles within the 
courts (Boyum&Mather 1986, Baumetal1981-1982, Kaganetal1977, 1978, 
Galanter 1986). Tracking social movements for reform of adjudication led to 
interest in the redistributive effects of judicial rationalization (Heydebrand & 
Seron 1990), mediation, and alternative dispute resolution [described at length 
by Menkel-Meadow (1984) and Galanter (1986) and extensively critiqued by 
Abel (1982)]. 
At the focal point of the literature on law and inequality is an article by 
Galanter, perhaps the most frequently cited in all of the earlier law and society 
research literature, which attempts to summarize the vast array of findings up to 
the mid-1970s (1975). The article presents a process model of the cumulative 
effects of disadvantage between those Galanter calls one-shot players in law 
and those he terms repeat players. The disadvantages stem from differences 
in knowledge, experience, material resources, and the social context of typical 
pairings between one-shotters and repeat players. In addition, the differences 
in knowledge, resources, and organizational capacity are exacerbated by the 
institutional biases of legal process itself-unequal access to lawyers and abil-
ity to command their best efforts, the complexities of litigation that favor the 
knowledgeable and the rich, and the advantages of being able to "play for rules" 
in legislatures and before courts. In all but explicit terms, the article presents 
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a comprehensive summary of the sociology of law research showing that the 
system of justice is thoroughly embedded in the class structure, and indeed the 
title of the article carries the message-"Why the Haves' Come Out Ahead." 
While Galanter presents a clear and powerful description, he does so, much 
as does the field itself, without developing a strong conceptual or theoretical 
scheme: In an article laced with evidence of inequality and hierarchy, the term 
Haves', like social class itself, is neither defined nor theorized.3 
Law and Inequality From the Ground Up 
There is a second, anti-instrumental and anti-formal tradition of research and 
theory development in the sociology of law. In contrast to structural models 
of law and society, grounded theory gives much greater weight to agents' roles 
in constructing frames of reference.4 For example, Blumberg (1967), Sudnow 
(1965), and Macaulay (1963) assume that the relationship between inequality 
and law can be understood primarily from the interactions among actors in 
the settings studied. Blumberg & Sudnow describe the construction of typifi-
cations through interaction between the regular participants in criminal court 
proceedings-the judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel. "Normal" crimes re-
ceive well-understood, routine treatment, based on typification of the defendant 
and the crime situation. Mutual commitments are made between court regulars 
about the expeditious disposition of cases that leave defendants, usually poor, 
out of the negotiation. 
Macaulay's study of noncontractual relations in business has been highly 
influential in shaping this microsociology of law. Macaulay observed that 
sales transactions between businesses led to the establishment of continuing 
relations between sales personnel and the creation of sales practices based on 
mutual commitment established through long-term dealings (Macaulay 1963). 
The law, though technically applicable, was largely irrelevant to such practices 
when continuing relations developed between actors. The continuing-relations 
hypothesis, quite similar to observations on conflict resolution by anthropolo-
gists, makes understanding the effects of inequality considerably more complex, 
3The lone effort to develop a general theory of law and inequality (Black 1976) also fails to do 
more than offer a set of unexplained categories. Black predicts a patterning of legal relationships 
according to the relative position of parties in the social order. For example, he predicts that the 
greater the social distance between two individuals, the more law will govern the relationship and 
the greater the likelihood of third-party intervention to resolve a dispute. Black's insistence that 
theory consider only observable behavior, not meaning or understanding from the actor's viewpoint, 
has been highly controversial. By providing a target for such criticism, Black helped to coalesce 
interest in the ideological analysis of the role of law and in interpretive theory. 
4 An anthropology of law also played an important intellectual role in the development of socio-
legal studies. Indeed, much of the work on dispute processing borrows heavily from anthropology 
(Nader 1969, Collier 1973, Moore 1978, Mather & Yngvesson 1980-1981, Merry 1982). 
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as Macaulay himself noted. Among his purchasing agents, continuing relations 
developed among relative equals, but not between large and small or among 
the very large businesses. Commenting on the generalizability of Macaulay's 
study, Yngvesson argued that continuing relations need not involve equals nor 
be based on trust, and they may involve coercion to prevent recourse to the law 
(1985, see also Macaulay 1966). 
Reflecting on the implications of the line of research inspired by his study, 
Macaulay has suggested that continuing relations in the form of social networks, 
private associations, organizations, and informal groups break down formal 
structure and instrumental legal processes, rendering the state-society boundary 
meaningless. Sociology of law thus constructed from the ground up supports 
many of the impulses that led to rejection of class-structural theory of the 
state, including the claim that agency is more important than the invisible hand 
of class. Anticipating this turn in sociology of law, Macaulay has remained 
firmly committed to the importance of the role of social life in explaining the 
relationship between law and inequality (1984). 
Legal Ideologies and Social Class 
The failed social reforms and revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s fueled dis-
illusionment with structural theories of law, in particular theories of class-
instrumentalism. Empirical studies of contemporary and historical legal conflict 
by Marxist scholars pointed to a more ambiguous role for class in determining 
the long-run benefits and burdens imposed by law. A study of the court dispo-
sitions of participants in riots by African-Americans in Detroit in 1968 (Balbus 
1973) showed that even in response to a serious episode of class and racial 
strife the courts followed conflicting imperatives. The findings of the study 
cast serious doubt on the ability of any one perspective, in particular class the-
ory, to explain the behavior of courts even in the middle of a serious episode of 
class conflict. Similarly, studies by Hay (1975) and Thompson (1964, 1975) of 
the enforcement of repressive eighteenth century English criminal laws showed 
that law aided class rule by being violent but also by seeming, and to a degree by 
being, just. Thompson concluded that the law displayed a "relative autonomy" 
from class control: 
It is true that the law did mediate existent class relations to the advantage of the rulers ... On 
the other hand, the law mediated these class relations through legal forms, which imposed 
again and again, inhibitions upon the actions of the rulers (1975 :264 ). 
The sociology of law was deeply influenced by the European Marxists and 
neo-Marxists on the subject oflegal ideology (Gramsci 1992, Hunt 1981, 1985). 
The concept of ideology provided a means of avoiding simplistic claims about 
mechanical class rule and false consciousness. The new challenge was to 
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examine the politics of law-the playing out of class conflicts in contests about 
the meaning of law in a process that was class-biased but historically contin-
gent. Instrumentalism, state-centered law, structural models of society, and 
ahistorical social science all came into question as ideology became the vehicle 
for explaining the relationship between law and social class.5 Reviewing the 
literature on the study of law as ideology, Hunt cautioned "ideology is and 
will remain a difficult, slippery, and ambiguous concept" (1985:31), though it 
endures as a powerful lens for explaining the role and power of the legal form 
in social relations. 
Some who have contributed to the growing body of research on legal ide-
ology have assumed, as did most Marxist scholars, that legal ideology is a 
terrain of struggle, conflict, and indeterminacy, but also that ideology is re-
lated to "broader social forces rooted in economic, political, and other prac-
tices and to institutions" (Hunt 1985:32), i.e. the reproduced patterns of so-
cial life that we have called structure. For example, Larson (1977) examined 
the historically contingent ways in which lawyers and other professionals se-
cured a powerful class position by using ideological claims-merit, science, 
and service--coupled with political closure and control over access through 
university-based education and licensure by the state. Abel and his collabora-
tors (1982) describe the rise of the politics and ideology of informalism in law 
and the reasons for its seemingly contradictory effect--extending the legitimacy 
and power of the state to new disputes and new parties. Both studies document 
the historically contingent impulses embedded in legal institutions with a view 
toward explaining their role in legitimating a structurally unequal, class-based 
society. 
Studies like those of Larson and Abel that located legal ideology in an in-
stitutional structure have avoided a simplistic base-superstructure reading of 
Marx by emphasizing the complex and often contradictory functions of law in 
society, including the ways in which law constrains both the dominated and 
the dominating and the contingencies that mediate the law's effects. Some 
scholars have criticized the lingering instrumentalism and structuralism in such 
sociological studies of ideology (Harding 1986, Trubek 1984). Indeed, some 
scholars of legal ideology begin from altogether different premises. 
As we show in the next section, a growing body of research focuses on 
interpretation, holding "that the meanings of cultural and social forms are 
5Feminist scholarship made a particularly important contribution by expanding the horizons 
of investigations, raising critical questions about method, and questioning whether there is even a 
distinction between theory and method (Menkel-Meadow & Diamond 1991). Within the sociology 
of law, feminist scholars have examined the entry of women into male bastions such as law practice 
(Epstein 1981, Menkei-Meadow 1989), courts (Cook 1978), and alternative dispute resolution 
(Menkle-Meadow 1984). 
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constituted in their use" (Greenhouse 1988:687, emphasis added). The re-
lationship between law and inequality is to be understood as the social and 
cultural processes by which things (genders, races, individuals, nations, and so 
on) come to be recognized as differentiable ... from the eye of the beholder" 
(1988:688). Because this perspective also holds that there are no intrinsically 
or historically prior differences, the interpretivist task is to study only how some 
symbols of difference become "legitimate 'givens' of public life" while others 
do not (Sarat & Felstiner 1988, 1995). 
Grounded sociological theory oflaw and inequality (described earlier) priv-
ileges agency by emphasizing the sociological task of explaining the ways in 
which agents act and construct social meanings in the process. Interpretive the-
ory in the sociology of law takes this one step further by being anti-institutional 
as well. Social difference--race, class, gender, or sexual preference--is ex-
plained entirely through the words, meanings, and language used by actors in the 
process of going about their business as citizens, employees, legal professionals, 
plaintiffs, or defendants. Interpretive explanations of difference are theoreti-
cally severed from any analysis of ongoing patterns of society outside the frame-
work by which meaning is created for the actors being considered. There is no 
place for a classical sociological concept of structure in such an analysis, and in 
particular there is no room for analysis of relational inequalities such as class. 
NARRATING THE STORIES OF LEGAL EXPERIENCE 
An emerging sociology of law employs interpretive methods to examine narra-
tives and texts in order to understand legal ideology, legal consciousness, and 
law in everyday life. A constitutive theory of law attempts to understand the 
ways in which law forms identity and experience and is, in turn, constituted 
by the everyday interactions that give law meaning. Constitutive theory shares 
with Michel Foucault's ( 1977) description of cultural history a belief that culture 
determines the micro-distribution of power, thus decentering-but also largely 
determining-the allocation of power in society. As we noted in the first part 
of the chapter, some studies of legal ideology acknowledge the importance of 
the institutional dimension of action. Others, including those based upon con-
stitutive theory, pursue the origins of meaning but not the dimension of social 
interaction that we term structure (Geertz 1983, Sarat & Felstiner 1995). 
Narratives of legal consciousness are among the most common forms of 
interpretive scholarship employed on behalf of the constitutive perspective. 
Narratives have been used to demonstrate that power is contingent and specif-
ically that power may not be determined by categories such as race, gender, 
or class. For example, the narratives of a welfare mother (White 1993), an 
African-American law professor (Williams 1991), a female defendant (Ewick 
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& Silbey 1992), and parents of children with disabilities (Engel 1993) have 
been used to show that the expected hierarchies of wealth, race, or professional 
status can be subverted. 6 
In a recent review of this literature, Ewick & Silbey attempt to explain the 
contingent relationship between reproduction of the social order and narratives 
oflegal consciousness (1995). They argue that there are limits to the power of 
narrative to subvert the existing social order because "[a]ll stories are produced 
and communicated interactively with a social context" (p. 211). While "nar-
ratives are likely to bear the marks of existing social inequities, disparities of 
power and ideological effects," yet, the "assumption that 'society' is an ongoing 
production that is created daily anew, rather than a fixed and external entity" 
is a reminder of the "dual capacity of reproduction and invention" (p. 222). 
Although they attempt to come to grips with the stability of "existing social 
inequities" and other patterns of social order that condition the timing, content, 
and interpretation of narratives, Ewick & Silbey's formulation of "reproduc-
tion and invention" offers no means of explaining such patterns other than the 
narratives themselves. Similarly, those who present narratives of the legal con-
sciousness of the poor assume that such narratives, by themselves, provide a full 
understanding of law and poverty (see, e.g. Sarat 1991, Ewick & Silbey 1992, 
White 1991). Such studies collapse the distinction between idea and action. 
Put differently, by taking poverty to be what the poor say about poverty, such 
studies of narratives, methodologically and conceptually, abandon analysis of 
the social patterns or institutional practices and histories of poverty and law.7 
Interpretive sociology of law is well illustrated by Felstiner & Sarat's obser-
vational study of lawyer-client interactions during divorce counseling (1995). 
Lawyer-client exchanges are interpreted to show how power "unfolds," "shifts," 
"permeates," and "moves" between lawyer and client in the process of defin-
ing, negotiating, and settling a divorce. For the lawyer, "interaction takes 
place in a familiar space and a space of privilege" symbolized by, for example, 
6 Although there are passing references to the working class, welfare poor, or the occupational 
status of the individuals' whose consciousness is described, these typifications are not carefully 
identified apart from the holism of oppressed consciousness, and there is often little or no systematic 
evidence of relevant group characteristics (Merry 1990, White 1990, Sarat 1990, Ewick & Silbey 
1992, Alfieri 1992). Equally common are interpretive accounts that imply that social differences 
or power are completely dependent on contingencies that occur during social interaction (Abrams 
1993, Sarat & Felstiner 1995). 
7Critical race scholars claim that (auto)biography, legal cases, personal experience, and histori-
cal chronicles are powerful forms of "storytelling in the law" (Lawrence 1992:2278), which permit 
the reader to live in the writer's world as she thinks about identity, law, and action (Williams 1991, 
Bumiller 1988, Engel 1991, Ewick & Silbey 1992, Sanger 1993). For example, White (1991) 
writes about an African-American welfare mother who speaks up at a welfare hearing, contrary 
to her attorney's advice, a story that shows the possibility of autonomous action in spite of the 
repressive power of the context and the woman's own attorney. 
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the office, law books, language, or rituals. But the lawyer's power over the 
client is "malleable." Sarat & Felstiner acknowledge that "structure" circum-
scribes and shapes "a limited reservoir of possibility defined by history and 
habit" (1995:23), but the outcome of the circumscription of possibility is rarely 
predictable or routine. From the interpretive perspective, inequality in power 
unfolds "in its use." 
We are left to speculate: Are gender, race, class, or power so completely 
malleable? Is there no power in such differences to create inequality that shapes, 
or compels, or moves individual action or group interaction whether conscious 
or not? Does the power of class, gender, or race--difference-exist only as 
experience "in the eye of the beholder?" Is there no institutional and social 
history of the power of class, race, or gender beyond individual experience? As 
White has recently suggested: 
While the Foucaltian lens reveals the fluidity of power, it does not show how power can be 
congealed in social institutions in ways that sustain domination. It may be true that everyday 
interactions create and maintain social institutions, but this insight does not enable us to 
map those interactions against the institutional matrices they create. Nor does this insight 
show us how institutions constrain the circulation of power, channeling it to flow toward 
some social groups and away from others (1992:1505). 
BRINGING CLASS BACK IN: AN AGENDA FOR THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 
Our review of sociolegal research has shown that analysis of class has declined 
in importance and that the recent interpretive research on law and inequality 
has abandoned the institutional and social organizational perspectives of earlier 
research. The theoretical framework for class analysis employed throughout 
much of the twentieth century has been challenged by the emergence of a 
global economy, indeed a global society, in which local movements for human 
rights can be linked across continents by e-mail and fax, by changes in the 
organization of work, and by the rise of new cultural themes of consumerism 
and personal identity. The turn toward an interpretive sociology of law offers 
a nuanced and microsocial understanding of the asymmetry, paradoxes, and 
contradictory relations of once familiar experiences across a range of social 
institutions. 
Nonetheless, interpretive research on law and inequality often inadequately 
addresses how individual lives are interwoven to become part of larger patterns, 
or why such patterns evolve and persist over time (Sewell1992). Contemporary 
society-including the role of law in attorneys' offices, in public agencies, and 
in everyday life--does not emerge on a tabula rasa and cannot be explained 
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exclusively by examining the interpretations of individuals outside of time and 
place. The limitation of an interpretive sociology, in particular the analysis of 
narratives, is in large part a limitation of method. While narratives may capture 
variation, improvisation, or resistance, by definition they cannot account for 
the institutional contexts of action, including the institution of class. 
In this concluding part we focus our attention on the continuing importance 
of relative differences in institutional power and resources for the sociology 
of law. Economic class remains one important element of inequality. Eco-
nomic class position, associated with employment (and unemployment), in-
come, and ownership of economic resources, is a nearly universal part of social 
experience.8 Because class is necessarily relational, everyone experiences in-
equality, difference, and almost universally, subordination in a fundamentally 
important aspect of sociallife.9 Notwithstanding the continuing importance of 
economic class, in the late twentieth century, a group's position is defined only 
partly by its economic class endowments. Other sources of capital-cultural 
and symbolic-also create hierarchies, power, and subordination as well as 
opportunities for change. 
The class theory of Pierre Bourdieu, to offer one promising example, exam-
ines the variation, improvisation, and even indeterminacy of agency without 
losing sight of group trajectories or the tendency toward reproduction of pat-
terns in social relations (Bourdieu 1985, 1987, Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). 
Groups are positioned by patterns in the distribution of endowments of capi-
tal. Bourdieu broadens the concept of capital to include the positioning power 
not only of economic relationships but also of cultural, social, and symbolic 
capital. Bourdieu's theory of agency considers the effects of a great range of 
resources while linking those resources to the societal processes that create or 
maintain them. The habitus, the interpretive context for action generated by a 
group's experience in society, is a system of "lasting, transposable dispositions 
which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of 
perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of 
infinitely diversified tasks" (1977:82-83). Bourdieu's concept of class is flex-
ible and empirical, providing a means of understanding both the positioning 
8 As Rosemary Crompton remarks in the course of an exhaustive assessment of research on 
class, "although 'work' may possibly have declined as a significant source of social identity, work 
is still the most significant determinant of the material well-being of the majority of the population" 
(1993:18). Our point is somewhat broader, namely that work is not only an important source of 
material resources but also a relational position that places individuals in a hierarchy of authority 
as well as hierarchies of symbolic and material power. 
9Class is a system of relational inequalities created by the economy. Class is a relational 
inequality because, unlike height or talent, it exists through a social process which requires that 
some individuals acquire more benefits, including authority, status, and income, than others. 
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power of historical conjunctions of capital endowments for particular groups 
and the contingency of individual action. 
While a theory of class such as Bourdieu's is complex and open ended, it 
offers a means of making more precise distinctions and observations about 
contemporary social relations. One consequence of failing to conceptualize 
class in more theoretical terms is to rely on even more problematic categorical 
descriptions by using holistic labels such as "working class American," "mid-
dle class family," "underclass African-American," or simply "poor," which are 
found in contemporary ethnographic studies of law and inequality. A theo-
retically informed concept of class, such as that employed by Bourdieu, will 
suggest specific institutional processes, generating inequality through endow-
ments of capital and the formation of a habitus. Further, more precise con-
cepts will make possible both comparison and extension of findings across 
studies. Herein lies the challenge-to build our understanding of the sources 
and continuity of social hierarchy while respecting the complexities of power 
and agency. 
Class and Law in Everyday Life 
Studies in the sociology of law reviewed in the first part of this chapter include 
research on everyday encounters with legal institutions, documenting the ways 
in which law may (or may not) be mobilized by individuals of different class, 
race, or gender. The early studies of legal mobilization have been criticized 
because they seemed to provide only static portraits of individuals, a character-
istic that has weakened categorical approaches to inequality. But the authors of 
many earlier studies were well aware of the dynamic and interpretive dimen-
sions of action, conflict, and the assertion of rights that have become the focus 
of attention in more recent qualitative research. Findings of such studies offer 
guidance for contemporary sociolegal research attempting to link class and law 
in everyday life. 
For example, research by Levine & Preston (1970) attributed a low rate 
of legal problem-solving among their low-income respondents to a lack of 
knowledge about rights and to lack of the legal competence often associated with 
higher income. Yet they considered that "subjects were probably experiencing 
powerlessness and a feeling of resignation in the face of circumstances about 
which they thought little could be done" (109) (compare Carlin et a! 1966, 
Felstiner 1980-1981). Mayhew & Reiss termed this perspective the personal 
resources theory, and they argued that it represented one aspect of their broader 
theoretical proposition that the role of law in everyday life is a product of the 
ongoing organization of social life and its institutional structure (1969). 
The recent turn to research on legal consciousness can expand our understand-
ing of the social organizational perspective. Studies of legal consciousness 
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directly examine what was merely inferred from very thin data in the early 
studies-passivity or activism, legal competence, powerlessness, resignation, 
and the like. Studies of legal consciousness also have a direct bearing on in-
stitutional structure. The meaning of such concepts as employment, authority, 
market, and property are the foundation for the institutions that shape "legal 
contacts" (to employ Mayhew & Reiss' phrase) linking class to rights and jus-
tice (Sennett & Cobb 1972, Willie 1985, Hochschild 1981), to legal conflict 
(Crowe 1978, Baumgartner 1988), or to beliefs about entitlements (Newman 
1988, Munger 1991). 
While research on legal consciousness could fill a gap in our understanding of 
the relationship between meaning and structure, such studies often overlook any 
process that informants themselves do not describe. In some research the social 
organizational understanding of action, and specifically class organization, has 
been lost altogether. Few studies of legal consciousness examine the social 
organization of work, or more generally the class structure, as a source of the 
ideological matrix comprising legal consciousness. 
For example, most recent community-based studies of legal conflict and dis-
pute resolution pay only limited attention to class, for there is no systematic 
tapping of class experience as such unless class is mentioned by the subjects 
(Greenhouse et al1994). Such studies have focused on inductive discovery of 
the groups-social networks, neighborhoods, and families-whose interpreta-
tions shape disputes and legal conflicts. While some scholars pursuing these 
studies have suggested that the silence of their informants concerning class 
may itself have significance (see Greenhouse et al1994:185), there is no way 
to determine which aspects of the legal experience or consciousness described 
by means of the research are attributable to the effects of social class. 
A more robust research agenda must attend to the social organizational ele-
ments deemed important for the formation of consciousness. As the focus and 
site of research in the sociology oflaw has shifted from formal legal institutions 
to the routines and events of everyday life that are only occasionally touched, 
if ever, by formal legal institutions, a broad invitation exists to explore beyond 
the outer edges of the narrative. Beyond the limits of narrative lie the patterns 
that connect the individual to jobs as well as to organizations, neighborhoods, 
families, associations, communities (with public authorities), and networks that 
enable or limit action, whether they are fully understood by their members or 
not. In these ongoing connections, class is the local embodiment of larger 
patterns shaped by property holding, market institutions, cultural preferences, 
and political organization, patterns that may be reconstructed locally, but as 
variations on themes that play more widely in society. 
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Class Hierarchy, the Economy, and the Legal Profession 
Sociolegal research on lawyers has encompassed research on professional ca-
reers and on the social role of lawyers. In both lines of study scholars have 
examined the effects of class hierarchy, mapping the effects of social stratifica-
tion on lawyers' careers and examining the effects of clients' wealth and power 
on lawyers' services. While the studies have been attentive to the effects of 
social hierarchies on professional stratification and differentiation, the research 
seldom considers lawyers in relation to class as an institution-namely the role 
of lawyers in the creation, maintenance, or changes in class organization. Fur-
ther, both lines of inquiry began with studies of the external factors explaining 
the behavior of lawyers; more recently they have begun to take greater account 
of the ways lawyers themselves understand their careers and social roles. This 
shift from deductive to inductive research has enriched our understanding of 
the organization of professional work but has exacerbated the tendency of re-
searchers to ignore the relationship between the profession and other institutions 
in society. 
Studies of the career patterns of attorneys have closely paralleled the de-
velopment of research on social stratification. The earliest work on lawyers' 
careers relied on conventional mobility models (Ladinsky 1963, Carlin 1962). 
Later research turned to network models to explain career patterns (Heinz & 
Laumann 1982, Nelson et al1987, Seron 1996). 
Two recent studies of lawyers' careers draw on contemporary theory of class 
formation to examine how the organization of lawyers' work helps construct 
class differences. Hagan et al (1988) employ a relational definition of class, 
i.e. focusing on domination within the work place, while Hagan & Kay (1995) 
apply Bourdieu's analysis of noneconomic class endowments to describe the 
careers of women lawyers entering the professional workplace. The work 
of Hagan & Kay suggests a means of extending the internal network model of 
professional stratification (Heinz & Laumann 1982, Nelson 1987) by examining 
the positioning of lawyers in a general class system. Contemporary theories 
of class formation (Bourdieu 1977, 1985) and agency (Sewell 1992) may help 
guide examination of the sources and significance of the social endowments 
possessed by lawyers and the development of their orientations as agents within 
a habitus created by class. 
A second illustration of the potential contribution of the concept of class to 
research on professional careers is a recent study by Seron of New York City 
lawyers ( 1993, 1996). Reflecting a more grounded, inductive research tradition, 
Seron showed how lawyers are able to pursue a variety of adaptive strategies for 
reorganizing their work in response to changing economic pressures. Within 
a system of stratification among law practices created by market opportunities 
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and lawyers' career endowments, lawyers demonstrate the possibilities for "re-
gulated improvisation" (Bourdieu 1977:77) by a group for which the habitus of 
professional role is well defined. Seron's perspective could be extended. For 
example, contemporary research on the relationship between economic restruc-
turing and reorganization within large law firms (Galanter & Paley 1991) would 
be greatly enriched by considering how lawyers form ideas about reorganizing 
large law firms and adapt to altered endowments of economic class capital and 
other forms of social capita! implicated in market changes. 
A large sociology of law literature considers the social role of the legal 
profession. Early research on the part played by the profession in promoting 
justice and ameliorating social inequality (Handler et al 1978, Capelletti et al 
1975) found an easy target in the structural-functional theory which specified 
that the profession stabilized and legitimated the social order (Parsons 1964). 
Alternative theories suggested that a self-interested monopoly of professional 
knowledge (Freidson 1986, Abbott 1988) or control of market position (Larson 
1977, Abel1989) motivated professional organizations and individual lawyer's 
behavior. 
The relationship between lawyers and the evolution of major institutions of 
the society, including the class system, should be a prime area for continuing 
development of theory and research. A great deal of empirical evidence has 
been amassed to show the uneven distribution of lawyer's services, reflecting 
the market power of clients and professional self-interest. Yet this literature 
initially failed to consider the institutional questions raised by such findings-
why social inequality persists and why it persists in particular forms (Currie 
1971). Later research on the organization and the social role of lawyers par-
tially addressed such questions by drawing on market dependency theory, which 
described the contribution of market pressure to the formation of professional 
organizations and the creation of a professional monopoly. But market depen-
dency theory, by itself, does not account for the nature of economic hierarchy, 
or the complex relationship between class, the work of lawyers, and the pro-
duction of professional culture (Nelson et al1992). Thus, in spite of decades of 
research showing that lawyers are influenced by client wealth and power, few 
broad theoretical attempts have been made to understand the role lawyers play 
in maintaining or transforming fundamental social institutions (Munger 1994). 
Weber maintained that lawyers' commitment to law, irrespective oflawyers' 
class origins or class loyalties, is an important prop for legitimate authority in a 
plural society ( 1954 ), while, in contrast, Marx argued that the professions served 
the interests of those who held ultimate power-the capitalist class (1950). 
Heinz & Laumann's study of stratification among lawyers in Chicago raised 
questions about whether any significant core values are shared by all lawyers 
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(1982). Their finding that lawyers are separated into two distinct hemispheres 
representing organizations and individuals, and subdivided further by types 
of practice within each hemisphere, suggests rather that lawyers' values vary 
considerably as a function of client influence (and by the class of the client). 
The turn to grounded research on lawyers' work has also suggested that lawyers 
create culture, as well as reflect culture, when they serve their clients (Gordon 
1982, Sarat & Felstiner 1995). For example, Dezalay & Garth conclude from 
their research on lawyers in international business transactions that lawyers are 
important carriers of legal and economic culture in the internationalization of 
trade and business relations (1995). 
As grounded research continues to explore the interplay between professional 
work and the creation of social organization, economic change, or the control 
of conflict, class theory offers a means of looking beyond the situated lawyer to 
the normatively constructed habitus of professional life and to the institutional 
pressures and limitations imposed by the economic organization of society (see 
Simon 1988, Alfieri 1992, Bezdek 1992, Seron 1993, 1996). Contemporary 
qualitative research on the work of the profession should examine the conditions 
under which lawyers contribute to the reproduction or change in fundamental 
patterns in society such as markets and classes (Harrington 1985, Halliday 
1987, Shamir 1993). 
Class Structure and the Administration of the Law 
By linking the internal practices of public and private organizations directly to 
the class structure of society, the theories of Marx & Weber posed a powerful 
hypothesis about the scope of social control.10 Yet empirical research has 
increasingly demonstrated the importance of institutional, organizational, and 
professional practices as ends in themselves (Heimer forthcoming; Reichman 
1989, Hawkins 1989, Heydebrand & Seron 1990). "Law from the bottom 
up" refers to the analysis of the practices of those who are the first-in-line (at 
the bottom of the authority ladder) to apply legal authority. Their practices 
do not merely alter the terms upon which law will be applied; they are the 
law (Cohen 1985, Massell 1968, Edelman et al 1993, Macaulay 1963). The 
research has undermined to a considerable extent the Weberian master-narrative 
of organizational order (cf Suchman & Edelman forthcoming; Lempert 1991). 
Such findings have made understanding the relationship of legal institutions 
to class structure both more difficult and more direct. To the extent that lower 
10Instrumental and structural Marxism argued that in the last analysis law reflected class domi-
nation. Weber argued that law was upheld by an autonomous legal profession, but he also argued 
that legal authority existed in constant tension with the social hierarchies of class and status that 
distorted such authority. Much sociolegal research supports the existence of direct effects of class 
on legal institutions, and we have reviewed these in first part of this chapter. 
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levels of officials, judges, police, prosecutors, and social workers are not con-
trolled by higher level authorities, the structural theories of the state and class 
seem to lose their relevance. To the same extent, however, organizations may 
be permeated much more directly by class organization or culture and other 
influences on bureaucrats and functionaries, whose jobs are defined through a 
mixture of situational constraints and grass roots accommodations (Cohen 1985, 
Handler 1990). While innovation and change may come from the bottom, more 
often the effect is to permit routinization of decision-making according to lo-
cally generated norms about what constitutes a "normal" case or a "last resort" 
case. These typifications are subject to class, race, and gender biases (Sudnow 
1965, Emerson 1981, Daly 1994). 
Studies of social control suggest not only that class is a factor in the treat-
ment of individuals but also that social control is organized quite differently 
to deal with different social classes. Through policing and welfare, the poor 
and especially the underclass experience a special kind of "government of the 
poor" (Simon 1993, Cohen 1985, Sampson & Laub 1993). In addition to a long 
line of studies showing that white collar crimes are treated relatively leniently 
(Sutherland 1955, Hagan et al1980, Shapiro 1987), Cohen argues that the "soft" 
technologies for social control-self-help, therapeutic guidance, education-
are reserved for those who have greater social and economic capital (1985). 
Simon suggests that the disparity in class treatment is increasing because grow-
ing income differences, increasing numbers of permanently unemployed, and 
the Africanization and ghettoization of poverty in political discourse are con-
tributing to a shift in emphasis from rehabilitation and reform of the poor to 
surveillance and control (Simon 1993, Feeley & Simon 1992). 
"Loose coupling" (Hagan 1979) between and within the agencies of social 
control that is apparent from studies of crime control raises still broader ques-
tions about the relationship between class, state, and society. Loose coupling 
between state agencies as well as extensive interpenetration of state and soci-
ety often renders the state's attempts to regulate ineffective because power is 
shared among state agencies, private institutions, associations, and networks 
(Moore 1978, see especially Macaulay 1986). This state is not the class-state 
described by Marx, Weber, or Durkheim but is rather a more complex institu-
tion; it is dependent on the power of class but, absent special conditions, far 
less instrumental in its capacity. What implications do these findings have for 
the relationship between class structure and the role of the state's regulatory 
efforts over time? 
Four research strategies are suggested by current work on the relationship 
between class, law, and the state. The first is to study the formation of the habitus 
of routine decision-making by the bureaucrats responsible for disposing of most 
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of the state's business. Though the existing studies are revealing, they often do 
not approach their analysis of case decisions from the perspective of a wider 
set of cultural and institutional influences beyond the office setting. 
Second, the state may be studied as a collection of concrete critical decisions 
and ongoing relatively stable processes. Calavita's study of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service's handling of the bracero farm worker program shows 
that the theory that state bureaucrats are dependent on the resources of those 
with continuing access to the means of producing wealth must be supplemented 
with knowledge of the particular state managers involved in a particular decision 
(1992). The intersection of biography and the momentum of agency history 
exposes both the lasting dependencies between state and economy and their 
contingency. 
Third, the state-class connection may be usefully considered in light of a 
nonfunctional systems theory articulated by Block (1987) to take account of 
surprising, counterintuitive patterns, e.g. the strong response by law enforce-
ment agencies to the savings and loan crisis (Calavita & Pontell1994). Politics 
always creates an important contingency in law enforcement, especially in the 
United States (see Savelsberg 1994). 
Finally, as sociology of law becomes more international and more global in 
its subject matter, the endowments of class, the links between societies, and 
the institutional response to change take on new complexities. Hierarchy, dom-
ination, and resistance are altered by the pressures of a global economy, the 
interactions between cultures, or simply by the power of modem communica-
tions that makes it possible to bypass the courts and even the nation state to 
assert claims for rights. The juxtaposition of the use of local, national, and 
international legal institutions reminds us that the relations of domination and 
exploitation take on new forms in a global society, forms that are often consti-
tuted in ways unfamiliar to western sociologists (Upham 1987, Winn 1994). 
Class Mediation of Law and Social Change 
Classic social theory placed law in an instrumental role. Law could both create 
and respond to social change; indeed, state capacity to respond to or manage 
the consequences of industrialization was a core concern of the theories of 
Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. The poignant ineffectiveness and contingency of 
legislation and litigation during America's civil rights era in the 1960s had an 
impact (Scheingold 1974, see Gordon 1984), but skepticism about the instru-
mental effectiveness of law is an older theme in American sociology of law, 
reflecting, among other sources, the influence of legal realism (Arnold 1935). 
Authors such as Handler (1978) and Rosenberg (1991), who amass evidence of 
the failure of social movements for legal rights, base their skepticism on theories 
about the direct effects of class and inequality on the state, and they challenge 
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the liberal legal ideal of an effective, neutral, and responsive state. Handler and 
Rosenberg show that an imbalance in class resources combined with the inertia 
and bureaucracy of the state will nearly always defeat redistributive change (for 
an important critique of this view see Simon 1992). 
An important locus of the relationship between law and change lies outside 
formal legal process. Sumner's claim that folkways always prevail over state-
ways was clearly wrong. Law directly influences ordinary life. The ways that 
it influences ordinary life are many-by contributing to the creation of social 
norms, by producing knowledge that becomes a foundation for action, and by 
direct enforcement of change. The effects of law vary, but they are not always 
marginal or inevitably invisible. Based on what we know about class differ-
ences in knowledge, moral decisions, values, styles of conflict resolution, and 
their interaction with gender and race, there is surely a class component to 
the social change that law can create. Now we have come full circle, because 
to understand such effects we must understand the context in which action is 
contemplated and undertaken in everyday life. 
Michael McCann's study of the role of legal rights in the pay equity move-
ment (1994) takes seriously the challenges of studying legal change and legal 
consciousness at the grass roots. He applies a discourse theory of legal mo-
bilization in which "law is understood to consist of a complex repertoire of 
discursive strategies and symbolic frameworks that structure ongoing social in-
tercourse and meaning-making activities among citizens" (1994:282). Further, 
he argues that rights are "inherently indeterminate, pluralistic, and contingent in 
actual social practice (ibid)." While he also acknowledges the importance of in-
stitutional attributes such as social class and organizational or political context, 
his findings, like those in many recent studies that follow the turn to discourse 
and narrative, do not systematically locate the individuals interviewed in rele-
vant group contexts-in the continuing patterns of association and experience 
that were either similar across all workplaces or unique to particular settings. 
Thus, McCann's study brings us back to the concerns with which we began 
this essay, namely, appreciating the connection between the larger institutional 
patterns of a class society and the role of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Research without a structural concept of class impoverishes our understanding 
of law and inequality. Underlying the reluctance of many to examine class 
is a generation-long skepticism about the concept of structure. The structure-
agency problem goes to the core of sociological theory and method, and to 
what it means to conduct empirical research with conceptual rigor. A review 
of the literature in the sociology of law revealed swings between analyses that 
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emphasized structure or agency. Just as earlier theory in the sociology of law 
tended toward a more instrumental view of social action, so contemporary the-
ory tends to focus on the indeterminacy of action. While interpretive work 
presents an important critique of structural theory, structure and class have not 
gone away. 11 Class continues to describe an important aspect of social life, 
namely the powerful link between the lives of individuals and the economic or-
ganization of society that is beyond the control and often beyond the knowledge 
or full understanding of those individuals. 
Our review of ways that more careful attention to the role of class might 
enrich the sociology of law leads to several suggestions for incorporating the 
concept of class into sociolegal research: 
• The experience of class is a starting point. Biography-the experiences of 
individual and group through time-is fundamental. 
• The relationship of class structure to the activities of members of a class is 
complex. 
The direct effects of class structure are modified by the experience of race 
and gender, the roles occupied by individuals in complex organizations, and by 
the emergent and creative possibilities of social action. 
• Research on class requires a comparative perspective. 
Ultimately sociology studies the social group. Narrative and case-study 
methodology treat the subject as representative of a larger group. Identification 
of the similarities and differences between sites and subjects should be made 
explicit, and class is one of the important dimensions on which narrative and 
case studies can be compared. 
• The concept of class evolves through empirical research. 
Class theory suggests possible connections between the experience of the 
situated individual and the group-habitus and the larger patterns of social life, 
but our understanding of class rests on discovery of the precise role of class and 
habitus through empirical research. 
• The element of time is essential. 
11 Attempts to grapple with the structure-agency problem are in evidence across a variety of 
subfields, including the sociology of professions (Abbott 1988), comparative sociology (Orren 
& Skowronek 1994, Orren & Skowronek forthcoming; Somers & Gibson 1994), criminology 
(Savelsberg 1994), and organizations (Powell & DiMaggio 1991). The pivotal question is: 
"How [can} sociological theories which do accept the sui generis collective character of social 
arrangements ... retain a conception of individual freedom and voluntarism?" (Alexander 1982). 
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Both as situated experience and as a larger pattern in social life, class is 
best understood through biography and through community history. Class, so 
understood, is one important element in the accretion of particular routines, 
knowledge, and relationships that constitute the trajectory of a group through 
time. Out of these grow change and, equally, the tendency to reproduce the 
patterns of social life. 
The turn to narrative studies in sociolegal research reflects awareness of the 
importance of context and agency. But in taking this turn, contemporary stud-
ies of law and society have sidestepped the capacity to explain the sources 
and significance of difference and inequality in terms that individuals them-
selves cannot employ. While biographies are individually experienced and 
understood, they are also shaped by history not only of the individual's making 
(Calavita & Seron 1992). As C. Wright Mills (1959) concluded, the promise of 
the sociological imagination lies in explaining the link between the meanings 
of the private lives of individuals and "the larger historical scene." 
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